Although only a recently introduced term of art, philosophical enquiry under the rubric of "normativity" has quickly become a major industry. A date-range search of the Philosopher's Index for titles with the word returns zero results before 1980, 1 three results for the "80s, 76 results for the "90s, and (to date) 218 results for the 2000s. 2 Philosophical appeals to normativity are also exceptionally widespread. In addition to the subjects traditionally considered "normative"-ethics, practical reason, political and legal philosophy, and epistemology-it is increasingly common for philosophers to maintain that normativity is essential in the analysis of subjects as diverse as truth, meaning, probability, and psychological attitudes like belief. This article is therefore unavoidably selective and idiosyncratic in the issues and literature it addresses, focusing on some recent developments in metaethics on the nature of normativity.
the antirealists that no normative properties actually exist/ are realized in the world.
However, while error theory about narrowly moral facts and properties is a popular position in contemporary metaethics (e.g. Joyce 2001 Joyce , 2006 Kalderon 2005) , error theory about normativity as such is virtually unheard of, and so we can set it aside here. 5 What kinds of facts and properties might normative facts and properties be? We need to be aware of a significant ambiguity lurking here. If we operate with a loose sense of what is necessary for a fact or property to be normative, it can seem very easy to locate such things, because they are just ordinary facts and properties. For example, if it is a fact that (e.g.) Tony's tooth aches, this would widely be agreed to be a normative reason for Tony to go to a dentist. If it is a fact that Jenny has evidence that p, this constitutes a normative reason for her to believe that p. Sometimes philosophers claim that considerations like these are sufficient to establish that realism about normativity is correct (e.g. Bloomfield 2001) , or that there is nothing metaphysically strange about normative properties (e.g. Scanlon 2003) . However, it is not facts and properties like these that are the target of antirealists" skepticism. We need a distinction between facts and properties with normative significance, and facts and properties about normative significance (e.g. Parfit 2006: 333). The fact that Tony"s tooth aches-call it "T"-is an example of the former; it is a fact with normative significance. But the fact about normative significance would be the fact that T is a reason for Tony to go to the dentist.
The normative property here would not be the property of being painful, but rather the property of being a reason for action. Antirealists deny that such properties exist, and propose to give different accounts of what we mean by saying that these facts are reasons, or that they have normative significance. Do such facts and properties really exist, and if so how are we to explain what they are?
Realist views I: Nonreductionism
Presently enjoying a resurgence of popularity is a nonreductionist, quietist answer: Yes, normative facts and properties exist, but they"re not to be explained unless by appeal to more fundamental normative facts and properties. 6 This view is heir to G. E. Moore"s claim (1903) that goodness is indefinable, although today it is most commonly claimed that the relation of being a reason for (or "favoring", "justifying") is the fundamental normative component of reality (Scanlon 1998 , Raz 1999 . A prominent view of what it is for something to be good is T. M. Scanlon"s "buck-passing" account: for something to be good is simply for there to be some reason favoring having some attitude like desire or admiration toward it.
This nonreductionism has close ties to the suggestion, also originally due to Moore, that normativity is "nonnatural". This has passed into popular culture in the form of vague talk about the "naturalistic fallacy", equated with a failure to respect the supposed fact-value or is-ought distinctions. Metaethicists still commonly line up on one or another side of this naturalism/ nonnaturalism debate. However, there is no consensus even on what it means for a theory of normativity to be a form of "naturalism" or "nonnaturalism", so increasingly many writers prefer to avoid using these terms altogether. The problem is that Moore, whose metaethical views are taken as the archetype of a nonnaturalist position, leaves us with two independent legacies. One is the nonreductionist metaphysical doctrine that the normative is sui generis and unanalyzable into nonnormative components or in purely nonnormative terms, leading some writers to classify views as forms of "nonnaturalism" on this basis (e.g. Wedgwood Resistance to sui generis normative facts and properties revolves around charges of intolerable "queerness" (following Mackie 1977) on three dimensions: metaphysical, epistemological, and practical. They are often seen as metaphysically unacceptable by those who accept that physical science is the measure of what exists (e.g. Timmons 1999: 13). Some philosophers resist the reign of science over ontology, but recently it has been more popular to try to mitigate the apparent conflict. Normative properties are said to be "fully realized" by properties countenanced by science (Brink 1989 , ShaferLandau 2003 , Wedgwood 2008 . Normative concepts are merely ways of carving up the same, scientifically describable world-ways that only make sense from the perspective of nonscientific interests, as perhaps is also the case with folk-psychological and social concepts. Perhaps, then, sui generis normative facts and properties can even be causally efficacious, without trespassing on science"s domain (Wedgwood 2008).
Many are also skeptical about the possibility of knowledge of, or epistemic access to, these alleged sui generis facts and properties. This skepticism is usually directed toward intuitionist versions of nonreductionism. For example, Matthew Bedke (2009) argues that since our mental states can all be causally explained, it can only be a "cosmic coincidence" for the intuitionist if our normative beliefs are true. Nonreductionists argue that the possibility of normative knowledge can be defended, even if perhaps it can"t be explained. One common strategy is to appeal to the authority of first-order normative convictions. Surely if we know that anything is true, we know that it is true that (e.g.) torturing children for fun is wrong. So if our philosophical theories or worldviews suggest that such knowledge is impossible, then so much the worse for those theories or world-views. Another strategy appeals to partners in guilt: Russ ShaferLandau (2003) argues that all philosophical enquiry is synthetic apriori, so we shouldn"t be skeptical about normative knowledge unless we are also prepared to be skeptical about philosophical knowledge as such. Appealing to epistemological reliabilism, he argues further that even if we can"t explain how we acquire normative knowledge, all that it requires is that these (mysterious) mechanisms are indeed reliable. Ralph Wedgwood (2008) goes further, arguing that the rational dispositions constitutive of having normative concepts are reliable indicators of correctness.
Other objections to sui generis normative facts and properties proceed from the thought that there is something essentially practical about normativity. This practicality has often been understood in motivational terms. According to the doctrine 8 of (strong) motivational judgment internalism (MJI), if an agent judges that she ought to do A, then she must be motivated to do A. But the idea that objective, sui generis facts and properties could be "magnetic" or have this kind of close connection with the motivation of agents has struck many as unacceptably peculiar (Mackie 1977 : 40, Joyce 2001 . Today this kind of objection has largely been abandoned. First, there is broad consensus that strong MJI is too strong, since it doesn"t make room for the possibility of irrational failures to be motivated by one"s normative judgments. Accordingly, the preferred versions of MJI are weaker; the most popular version maintains simply that if an agent judges that she has a reason to do A, then she must have some motivation to do A so long as she is rational (e.g. Smith 1994).
Some recent defenders of sui generis normative facts and properties think that a closer connection to motivation can be accommodated. Under the slogan that "the intentional is normative", Wedgwood (2008) argues that normative and motivational concepts are interdefined, and that the characteristic conceptual role of normative concepts is to be specified in terms of certain dispositions of thought and intention. So, for example, the conceptual role of "ought" is tied to a disposition to form intentions to act. But easily the most popular response to motivation-based objections today is simply to deny that there is any interestingly close relationship between normative facts/ properties and motivation. Nobody argues this point more determinedly than Derek Parfit (2006), who suggests that support for MJI is simply a result of conflating normative authority with motivational force: in trying to fill out the blank in the equation, normativity=_____, philosophers have reached for psychological notions because they couldn"t imagine what else normativity could be. But Parfit contends that the very project is misconceived: normativity is just normativity. In the slogan that G.E. Moore borrowed from Joseph Butler, it "is what it is, and not another thing".
Practical queerness objections can be formulated instead in normative rather than motivational terms. Some philosophers object that sui generis facts and properties could not possess the authority over agents that is the essential characteristic of normativity. On acknowledging any such facts or properties, the objection runs, an In other words, the "So what?" challenge could only have force against nonreductionism if it were understood as a demand for (e.g.) reasons-rather than (e.g.) a challenge to be made to care. But it would only be supposed that the nonreductionist hasn"t already met this demand if one was assuming that reasons and normativity aren"t what the nonreductionist claims, i.e. if one were begging the question, perhaps by assuming the identity of normativity and motivational force.
Nonreductionists have been emboldened by these seeming failures of the familiar objections. But many philosophers remain unsatisfied with the thought that normativity might be brute and inexplicable. Even one recent defender of sui generis normative facts and properties, Wedgwood (2008), insists on the need and possibility of explaining normativity: he argues that normative concepts can be analyzed in terms of intentional attitudes, but remain sui generis for the reason that intentional attitudes themselves cannot be analyzed without appeal to normativity. Other realists claim that it is possible to provide noncircular analyses and explanations of normative facts and properties-"naturalistic" accounts, on one definition. We now turn to these views.
Realist views II: Neo-Aristotelianism
Neo-Aristotelian accounts of normativity (Foot 2001 , Bloomfield 2001 , Thomson 2007 are partly motivated by observation of significant continuities in our normative thought and discourse from agents to nonagents. They can be seen as understanding normativity as a special case of norm-relativity, where the norms for evaluations of things as correct or incorrect (or "defective") are provided by the nature of particular kinds of thing. On Thomson"s view, all normativity exists in virtue of the existence of "normative kinds". There is such a thing as a good toaster or person, and such as thing as what a toaster or a person ought to do, ultimately because toaster and person are both normative kinds. By contrast, without a special context it makes no sense to talk about a good pebble, or what a pebble ought to be like, because pebble is not a normative kind. In Thomson"s use, "normativity" has a meaning that is narrower than norm-relativity (she holds that being correct or incorrect is not a normative distinction if it isn"t connected with ways of being better or worse (the "evaluative") or how things ought to be (the "directive")). Yet normativity in Thomson"s sense is still broader than the widespread conception of normativity as "reason-giving": there are
normative facts about what a toaster ought to do, which don"t nontrivially entail anything about normative reasons. The normativity of reasons is a special case of kindrelative normativity: a fact is a reason for an agent S to do A just in case it "lends weight"
to the proposition that S ought to do A-i.e. to the proposition that S would otherwise be a defective member of some relevant normative kind. The peculiar normative nature of reasons, then, can be analyzed in terms of there being certain kinds of person or agent of which it is possible to be a defective or nonvirtuous member.
How is the existence of "normative kinds" to be explained, and what determines whether a kind is normative-like toasters and beefsteak tomatoes, but unlike pebbles and smudges? Aristotle"s answer appealed to the natural function (teleology) of certain kinds; although this notion has long been out of favor in modern science, recent neoAristotelians have embraced the development of new accounts of functions in the philosophy of biology (Thomson 1997 , Foot 2001 , Bloomfield 2003 , Casebeer 2003 .
Thomson is wary of the idea, however, recognizing the existence of normative kinds that are not "function-kinds", like tiger and human being (2008: 20) . This leaves the distinguishing characteristics of normative kinds murky; Thomson tells us only that "each of them is such that what being a K is itself sets the standards that a K has to meet if it is to be good qua K. " (2008: 21) If these appeals to functions and normative kinds can be vindicated, then neoAristotelian views of normativity would seem free of metaphysical and epistemological problems. Some worry, however, that neo-Aristotelianism cannot meet normative challenges. Why think that we have any reasons to avoid being defective members of our kind? Some neo-Aristotelians have adopted the same response as the quietists. If to have a reason to do A is nothing other than (for example) for it to be the case that we would be defective human beings if we did not do A, then there is no coherent challenge here (Foot 2001 , Thomson 2008 .
Realist views III: Neo-Humeanism
According to neo-Humean (or "instrumentalist") theories of normativity, normative facts are analyzable in terms of relations to agents" desires or similarly Many of these views can be thought of as extendedly Humean, because they view the normative significance of these ideal circumstances as deriving from the special interest that deliberating agents necessarily have in achieving them.
The classic argument for neo-Humeanism was an argument from motivation, which proceeded from the premises of strong MJI and the "Humean" Theory of Motivation (that all motivation requires a desire). Adherence to neo-Humeanism has declined as credence in strong MJI declined. But contemporary neo-Humeanism often starts out from different premises. A prominent argument is that it offers the best and simplest explanation of our first-order normative judgments; i.e. our ordinary intuitions about when agents do and don"t have reasons to act (Schroeder 2007) . A related basis is the desideratum of explaining the intuitive truth of hypothetical imperatives, which directly infer from agents" desiring ends that they ought to adopt the means. Once considered unproblematic and philosophically uninteresting, as philosophers have grown increasingly suspicious of motivational accounts of normativity and of the normative authority of desires, the challenge of explaining and accommodating the apparent truth of hypothetical imperatives has become one of the hottest topics in metaethics.
First-order normative judgments also present one of the chief objections to neoHumeanism, however. As Kant observed, moral claims are apparently "categorical", not conditioned on agents" desires. Epistemological normativity, or the "ought to believe", also looks like problematic data for neo-Humeanism (e.g. Kelly 2003 , Cuneo 2007 .
One instrumentalist strategy for dealing at least with moral claims is to adopt an error theory about categorical reasons (Mackie 1977 , Joyce 2001 , Kalderon 2005 , maintaining that these claims are all false-even if possibly useful. Schroeder (2007) rather argues that the requirements of morality might after all be desire-based, if there are certain requirements that follow from any set of desires whatsoever. 8 On a different, contextualist strategy, normative language is relativized to ends which may or may not be the agent"s desired ends. Hence moral claims can be relativized to moral ends (Finlay 2004 (Finlay , 2006 (Finlay , 2009 9 , and epistemic claims can be relativized to epistemic ends (Chrisman 2008) . Neo-Humeanism can be preserved by the claim that these normrelative "oughts" and "reasons" are only normative (they only matter) for a particular agent if they are relativized to ends that the agent desires (Finlay 2006) . Neo-Humean views are largely immune from metaphysical and epistemological objections, and they provide an easy explanation of a close connection between normativity and motivation-if there is in fact such a connection to be explained.
Besides first-order worries, the main objections here concern the normative authority of desire. Derek Parfit suggests that like MJI, neo-Humean accounts mistakenly conflate motivational force with normative authority, two quite different things. Neo-Humeans are not persuaded; if normativity consists in objective promotion or satisfaction 8 This is a close cousin of Michael Smith"s non-Humean instrumentalist view (1994) that moral requirements exist only on the condition that they follow from the set of desires that any agent whatsoever would have were they in ideal circumstances. 9 See Price 2009 for a similar but non-Humean contextualist view.
relations that actions etc. bear to desires, then normativity is distinct from motivational force. Neo-Humeans can also adopt the strategy of appealing to the analysis of reasons (Schroeder 2007) ; if facts about reasons just are facts about our desires (roughly speaking), then the demand for reasons for being guided by these facts is ultimately question-begging.
Antirealist views I: Expressivism
On antirealist accounts of normativity it has no in-the-world presence. Rather, it is properly construed as a characteristic of our words or concepts. The chief argument for antirealism has been that realist accounts cannot account for the special practical or motivational character of normative judgment. The classic noncognitivist views of A.J.
Ayer, Charles Stevenson, and R.M. Hare were forms of semantic behaviorism; 10 to understand the meaning of normative words or concepts is on these views to understand what attitudinal states someone is in, or what they are trying to do, when they use them.
These states are identified as essentially motivational states, to accommodate the special practical role of normative thought. This includes both self-motivating states and other-motivating states, so for example to think that you have most reason to do A is at least in part to be motivated to do A, while to assert that some other person has most reason to do A is to do something like issue a command to the other to do A. This set of views has encountered many problems, which can perhaps be collectively summarized as the complaint that normative thought and discourse sure do appear descriptive. 11 Early noncognitivists were largely oblivious to the extent of this problem, a situation which gave way to the project that Simon Blackburn named "quasirealism"-the project of showing that the antirealist had the right to say realist-sounding things (so that Alan Gibbard (2003) claims the right even to acknowledge the existence of normative "facts" and "properties"). Recently, however, some expressivists appear to be shifting to a more aggressive and less apologetic posture, maintaining that the appearances don"t favor realist over antirealist views at all. expressivists have yet given a satisfactory account even of negation (Dreier 2005) . Mark Schroeder (2008) demonstrates that expressivists can accommodate negation by holding that all normative sentences express a single kind of attitude, and that different predicates just affect that attitude's content, but argues that once we"ve set out on that road we have no choice but to embrace radically expressivist revisions of all our theories of logic, truth and meaning.
Expressivism also faces challenges to its raison d'etre. We"ve already noted the recent pushback against the idea that normative authority is just motivational force.
But modern day expressivists have also come a long way since Charles Stevenson suggested that by a "reason" for an agent we just mean any consideration that might have motivational influence on her. Gibbard argues that normative language plays an essential conceptual role in practical thought about "what to do"; on this basis he identifies the attitude underlying normative thought as planning (or intention).
Normative thought is thus thought that is "plan-laden", embodying agents" psychological commitments about how to act in various circumstances. To account for the extension of normative thought, Gibbard appeals to extended "contingency plans"-even for impossible scenarios such as (e.g.) when one is Julius Caesar deciding whether to cross the Rubicon.
Recently, a simpler strategy has become popular. Confusingly almost every different proponent of this kind of strategy has his own label for it; to give precedence to the earliest, we can call it "realist-expressivism" (Copp 2001) . 12 On these views, normative thoughts and utterances consist both of a descriptive and a nondescriptive or expressivist part (Barker 2000 , Copp 2001 theory (or fictionalism) about normativity. 14 If it is to have some kind of noncognitive attitude like planning to do A on the basis of R, then constructivism seems to amount to a kind of expressivism. So some constructivists have to work to distinguish their views from others surveyed above.
Conclusion
This survey barely scratches the surface of recent work on normativity, overlooking much important work, but I hope provides a helpful overview of the major available positions and some of the significant recent developments in the dialectic. The debate over the nature of normativity has been vigorous, and shows every sign of remaining so.
Nonreductionism, Neo-Aristotelianism, Neo-Humeanism, Expressivism and Constructivism all retain many dedicated champions, who show no inclination to surrender the battlefield.
